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A SIGNALING/BONDING MODEL OF EMPLOYER FINANCE OF GENERAL TRAINING
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the central propositions of the human capital theory of on-the-job
training is that workers pay for and receive all the benefits of general
training. Since general training raises a worker's ability to be productive
in other organizations as well as the one providing the training, the training
firm must pay a wage commensurate with the trained worker's new higher level
of productivity if they are to prevent the loss of their trained workers.
Since the workers, not the firm, get the benefits of the training, "firms
[will] provide general training only if they [do] not have to pay any of the
costs" (Becker 1962 p. 13). Since the training is of value to prospective
trainees, equilibrium in the training market requires that "employees pay for
general on-the-job training by receiving wages below what could be received
elsewhere" (Becker 1962 p. 13) in a job offering no training.
This paper challenges the general validity of these simple predictions.
It begins in section 2 by presenting empirical evidence that (1) trainees
often do not have to accept lower wage jobs in order to obtain training and
(2) that employers often appear to be sharing the costs of general training
with employees. In section 3 we expand and generalize Hashimoto's elegant
theory of the sharing of the costs and benefits of specific training and show
why with our modifications firms choose to offer front loaded compensation
packages in which they appear to share the costs of general training with
their employees. Employers share in the finance of general training for three
reasons: (1) they have better access to capital markets than employeesl, (2)
1-0
turnover damages the reputation of the employee so workers ask employers~put
up a bond at the initiation of the employment relationship so as to minimize
their risk of involuntary separation and (3) the firm providing general
training is better able 'to assess the success of that training than any other
employer and this information assymetry effectively transforms skills that are
technically general into skills that are behaviorally specific. In section 4,
we examine the realism of the key assumptions of the theory--workers have
limited access to capital markets and suffer severe long term damage if fired-
-which drive the predictions of the theory. The final section of the paper
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2uses the theory to speculate on the reasons why employer training appears to
be substantially heavier in Germany and Japan than in the US.
II. EMPIRICAL ANOMALIES
While the logic of Becker's prediction that employers will not and
workers must pay for general on-the-job training seems impeccable, tests of it
in large representative data sets are few an~hat have been conducted
have generally failed to confirm it. In a, st-1!dy o-f 1fccent school lcavcrs ill
~the National Longitudinal Survey, Parson's (1985, table 7.6) found that when y~
~
~f "the skills [I am] learning would be valuable in getting a better job,"
w~
~ported to be
.,
'ory t""o'. the job paid on average 2.4 to 14 percent mflli>
.~
.
;
h/~
than when the respondent reported the above statement was "not at all true"
~
~J
even when an extensive set of controls for schooling and academic achievement
were included in the model. Another test of the Becker hypothesis can be
,'-4j
conducted in the 1984 follow up of the High School and Beyond seniors. This
survey contains the necessary data on the training received in the current or
most recent job and an extensive array of worker characteristics that can be
used to control for the skills and ability of the worker. Becker's prediction
was tested by regressing the log of the deflated starting wage of the current
or most recent job on indicators of the receipt of employer sponsored training
while controlling for an array of background characteristics.A The
coefficients on the training variables and statistics describing the overall
fit of the model are presented in Table 1. Contrary to Becker's prediction,
the jobs offering some training rather than none or which offer greater
amounts of training paid higher starting wage rates even when a whole array of
human capital characteristics were controlled. For females the positive
effect of receiving training on the starting wage was statistically
significant. Adding dummies for occupation and industry did not change the
results appreciably.
It could be argued, however, that these findings do not constitute a
decisive refutation of the proposition that workers pay all of the costs of
general training. Hiring decision makers are probably much better at
assessing the ability of job candidates than econometricians whose only data
J)J
i
..J
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is what appears on the High School and Beyond data tap,e. The positive I
~ -AYe It-J V' fvv /
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Number of different types
of training received on .022 .016
.040*** .030**
the job (range 1-5) (1.56) (1.05) (3.40) (2.38)
Total Hours of Training (lOO's) .007 .006
(1.42) (.89)
Total Hours Training Squared
-.00025** -.00016
(lO,OOO's) (2.24) (.93)
Dummys for Industry & no yes no yes
Occupation Included
R Square .065 .131 .078 .121
Table 1
Effect of Receipt of Training on a Worker's Starting Wage
Males Females Means
White White
Males Females
.65 .78
1.85 .88
42.1 11.0
The dependent variable is the log of the deflated starting wage of the current or most
recent job. The sample is 1980 high school graduates who in 1984 were not attending
college full time and do not have a military occupation. The background characteristics
that are controlled include: time spent attending college during 1982 and 1983, work
experience and vocational training in high school, high school GPA, grades in trade and
business courses, test scores, attitudes toward work and school, number of extra
curricular activities and leadership positions, self esteem, locus of control,
deportment in high school, married, children, number of siblings, race, hispanic,
parental income, parental education, parental occupation, urban, rural and 10
regional dummies and ,length of tenure on job and its square.
3association between wages and training arises, it could be argued, because
workers who are highly able (in ways not observed by the analyst) are both
paid more and also recruited for jobs that require large amounts of training.
This phenomena is probably contributing to the positive association
between training and starting wage rates, but to transform a large negative
structural relationship into a statistically significant positive
relationship, there would have to be very powerful sorting of more able job
applicants into jobs with heavy training investments. If such a selection
process were operating, access to training should depend on ability factors
that are visible to the analyst as well as on factors that are not visible to
the analyst. The results of a test of this hypothesis in the same High School
and Beyond data are presented in Table 2. The dependent variables in the
analysis were a dummy variable for having received some employer sponsored
training and the trainee's estimate of the total number of hours that were
spent in training. The ability proxies hypothesized to have a positive effect
on the receipt of training were: test scores, GPA, grades in vocational
courses, deportment in school, number of vocational courses, number of
academic courses, hours spent doing homework, hours spent working for pay,
number of leadership roles, having an internal locus of control (the belief
that one controls one's own fate), an index of reading in high school, and a
positive response to "do you enjoy working for pay." Variables hypothesized
to have a negative effect on the receipt of training were: did not graduate,
hours watching'TV, and self reported study habit problems. The model
estimated also included controls for tenure on the job and its square, race,
hispanic, marital status, 5 variables describing college enrollment since high
school, parental education, occupation and income, number of siblings,
urban/rural dummies, and a set of ten dummies for region.
Despite reasonably large samples--1938 men and 2554 women--, the analysis
offers only limited support for the hypothesized positive association between
ability/productivity proxies and the receipt of training. Only two of 16
variables thought to proxy for ability/productivity had significant
coefficients of the correct sign in two or more of the 4 regressions: average
weekly hours worked for pay during the junior and senior year of high school
and the intervening summer and the number of vocational courses taken in the
final three years of high school. Of the 64 coefficients tested, only 31 had
Table 2
Effect of Indicators of Learning Ability on Receipt of
Employer Sponsored Training
Received Hours
Female Some of
Mean S.D. Training Training
Men Women Men Women
Test Score 51 8.7
-013 .004** -.7 .82
(1.19) (2.32) (.34) (.80)
GPA 82 7.5 at5 -.0026 4.3** ~)~
.) (1.47) (2.05) 1.7 /
High Grades in Bus/C1er (0-1) .47 .50 .005 .033 -43.0
-2.0
(.17) (1.51) (1.55) (.15)
L.)
High Grades in Trade & Tech (0-1) .07 .26 .012 .014 32.6 53.4**
(.45) (.35) (1.11) (2.39)
Good Deportment in School
-.38 2.90 -.003 .0007
-.6 -1. 3
~~.2
(.84) (.17) (.15) (.54)
Vocational Courses A-~ 1.8 .003 .116** 4.3 7.2*(.52) (2.39) (.67) (1.82)
Academic Courses 10 2.8 \Ai 5- .013*** -.003 -5.2 4.8*
(2.64) (.79) (1.01) (1.90)
Did Not Graduate .01 .09
-.10 .12 9.9 155.0*
(.78) (.80) (.71) (1.8)
Wkly. Hours on Homework 3.5 2.5 -.001 -.008**WS 1.96 -.67
<;~ (r;VdJ~9
(.20) (1.96) (.36) (.26)
Wkly. Hours in Jobs 9.7
.003*** .005*** 1.2 1.4**(2.75) (4.35) (.95) (2.11)
Wkly. Hours Watching TV 21.5 11.8 .000
-.001 .32 -.006
(.003) (1.55) (.30) (.01)
# of Leadership Roles
.69 1.02 -.004 -.006 10.4 8.1
(.13) (.24) (.37) (.45)
Internal Locus of Control
-.04 .69 .02 .005 45.3** -10.7
(1.08) (.27) (2.27) (1.03)
W~
Study Habit Problems (0-4) 1.05 .95 .006
.025** 19.4 1.2
(.46) (2.04) (1.42) (.18)
Reads a lot (0-3) 1.69 .88
-.004 -.004 -3.5 -1.8
(.31) (.34) (.23) (.25)
Enjoys working for pay (0-1)
.92 .28 .064 -.054 63.7 -1.5
(1. 64 ) (1. 45 ) (1. 54) (.07)
R2
.071 .063 .069 .044
Mean of Dependent Variable
.39 .41 133 69
Standard Deviation
.49 .49 499 250
4the hypothesized sign. Of the 11 coefficients significant at the 5 percent
level on a two tail test, three had the wrong sign.
Of possibly the greatest significance is the failure of high school
grades and test scores to have the expected effect on the receipt of training.
Industrial psychologists have found strong positive relationships between
success in training and test scores and a somewhat weaker positive
relationship between training success and GPA (Hunter and Hirsh, 1988).
Consequently, one would expect employers to seek out such workers when they
fill jobs requiring a great deal of training. This does not appear to be the
case in this sample for high school GPA had a negative effect on receipt of
training in three of the four regressions. One coefficient was significantly
positive but there were also two negative coefficients that were also
significant (at the 10 percent level on a two tail test). Only one of the
eight coefficients on dummies for good grades in vocational subjects was
statistically significant. Half of the coefficients on test score were
negative.
When filling jobs that require training, employers appear to try to
economize on training costs by seeking out workers who have already received
some training either on a job or in school. In other respects, however, their
selections do not appear to be optimal for they fail to recruit the high
school graduates with the strongest academic records and/or with high test
scores. Parsons obtained similar results when he estimated models predicting
which members of his sample had obtained "high learning" jobs. Given these
findings, it is hard to imagine how selection on ability factors that are not
proxied by High School and Beyond or NLS variables could be strong enough to
transform a large negative effect of training on the starting wage }nLthe true
I!;rstructural model into a positive association in this data set. ~,~~, J
.,b:1
'f'---') -
Even stronger evidence against Becker's predictions comes when we hold
the individual constant (and therefore avoid the problem of unobservable
ability variation across individuals) and look at patterns of change in
productivity and wages during the first year on the job. Studies by
industrial engineers of learning curves have found that in many jobs new hires
are unable to make any significant contribution to output for weeks and often
take a year or more to reach the productivity standard of an experienced
worker (King 1964, Talbot and Ellis 1969). Wages, in contrast, exhibit a
5remarkably flat profile in the first year on the job.
An explanation for these phenomena provided by human capital theory is
that the training must be specific and the employer must be financing all of
its costs. But standard models of the sharing of the costs of specific
training do not predict that employers pay all of its costs and some of the
new revisionist theories--Salop and Salop's (1976) adverse selection theory--
predict that employers pay none of the costs of specific training.l The
specific training explanation of the flat wage profile is especially suspect
when to all outwardappearancesthe trainingis largelygen~~a~~~/
Studies of who pays the costs of apprenticeship trainingAin three
~~
different nations--Germany,Great Britain, and the United States--all
~contradict the claim that employers will not provide general training if they
~have to pay some of its costs (Noll et al 1984; Ryan 1980; Jones 1985;
~~
Weiderhold-Fritz 1985). Despite the transferable character of the training
and high turnover rates, these studies concluded that employers made large
~I~~~
~~r
investments in general training that were not recovered during the
apprenticeship. A welding apprenticeship program at a major U.S. shipyard was
the subject of the first of these studies (Ryan 1980). The wage profile was
quite flat--starting at $3.99 and topping out at $5.26 after about two years
on the job--even though the investments in general training were very
considerable. Inexperienced new hires spent 36 days in vestibule training
before beginning work. During the first week following vestibule training,
the trainee's output net of repair requirements was less than 10 percent of an
experienced worker's output. Thirty-seven weeks after being hired it reached a
level of 55 percent and at 60 weeks a level of 80 percent of an experienced
worker's output. Despite the fact that the local economy was in deep
recession, separation rates were extremely high: 10.8 percent per month for
beginners and 6.3 percent per month for those with 12 to 24 months of tenure.
The shipyard accounted for about one-fifth of the welding jobs in the area.
When trained welders left the shipyard, they typically found better paying
welding jobs at other local employers. This evidence clearly establishes that
the shipbuilding company was contributing to the costs of general training.
The study of German apprenticeship training by the Bundersinstitut fur
Berufsforschung found that in 1980 training costs ranged from a high of 25,200
DM per year for telecommunications technician apprentices to 2400 DM for
6rates.
apprentice gardeners and averaged 10,300 DM or $5668 per year at 1980 exchange
The apprentice's contribution to output, which was netted out to
arrive at the above figure, averaged 6700 DM per year (Weiderho1d-Fritz 1985).
Jones's (1985) study of apprentice training in the engineering industry in
Great Britain found that the employer's training costs were 1.31 times the
annual payroll costs of a skilled worker and the apprentice's contribution to
output (which was netted out in calculating the estimate of employer costs)
was 1.26 times the payroll costs of a skilled worker. Thus even major upward
revisions of these estimates of the apprentice's contribution to output would
not change the basic conclusion that employers appear to be sharing the costs
of general training.
In the section that follows we present a formal exposition of a theory of
training and compensation packages that predicts the kinds of empirical
findings just reviewed. The theory to be presented owes much to Hashimoto's
(1981) elegant formulation of how workers and firms share the costs and
benefits of investments that are specific to a match between worker and firm.
Sorting effects, transfer costs, turnover events as signals, imperfect
signaling of the outcomes of general training and differential access to
capital markets are all incorporated into one model.
implications of the model is as follows:
Some of the important
0 Anything that contributes to the specificity of the match has the
effect of l~wering the second period wage below the worker's
productivity in the firm and raising the first period wage by a
compensating amount. Training in skills specific to the firm is one
cause of specificity. Another four are identified: the damage to a
worker's reputation from being fired or quitting, the adjustment costs
of finding another job and adjusting to it, the improvement in the
average productivity of the remaining workers that results from
dismissing the least productive, and the sorting effect that results
from the exit of those with the best alternative opportunities and
those who dislike their current job.
0 When elasticities of labor supply are greater for new hires than for
trained workers with more than a year or so of tenure at the firm, the
time pattern of compensation will reflect the relative rate at which
employers and workers discount future earnings and the wage
elasticities of voluntary and involuntary turnover. Since the young
workers who need general training the most have only limited access to
capital markets, they discount the future much more heavily than their
employer and as a result compensation tends to be front loaded.
70 When employers cannot accurately measure the amount and quality of
general OJT that job applicants have received from other employers,
w~rkers tend to reduce their investment in general OJT and employers
pay some of the incremental costs of investment in technically general
OJT. The level of investment in general OJT that results and response
to improvements in the quality of the signals of general OJT depends
on both discount rates, the separation rate, the proportion of
marginal investments in general OJT that are perceived by other
employers and the response of turnover to marginal increases in the
quality of general training that are not accurately perceived by other
employers.
0 During the first year on a job a worker's productivity net of
training costs grows much more rapidly than the wage even when
training is completely general and employers therefore appear
to be sharing the costs and benefits of general training.
Whi1e~'fme of these results have appeared in earlier papers (eg. Parsons 1972;
Feuer~1981), much of the recent wage growth literature appears to ignore the
impact of differential access to capital markets, of specific human capital
investments other than training and of signaling problems on wage growth and
incentives to invest in training (Garen 1988). The purpose of this paper is
to point out just how important these effects are by incorporating these
factors in a formal model and then by reviewing empirical literature on
transition costs and liquidity constraints to show that when reasonable
assumptions are made about their magnitude, big changes occur in predicted
rates of wage growth during the first year on the job.
III. THEORY
The firm's training level and wage profile will be analyzed in a simple
two period model. Training is assumed to produce two types of skills:
general skills (g) which are useful at other firms and specific skills (h)
which are productive only at the firm providing training. The cost of the
training C(g,h) are incurred in the first period and the benefits are received
in the second period.
There are two random elements in the model. The first is the utility
that a worker can attain by leaving the firm at the beginning of the second
period, and the second is the worker's second period productivity in this firm
after the training is completed.
two periods are the following.
Ye assume that wages and productivity in the
81st period at the firm
2nd period at the firm
2nd period at other firms if quit
2nd period at other firms if fired/laidoff
Worker
Productivity
P
P+g+h+fo
Worker
Utility
W
w2
U(g)
U(g)
- T + f
-T -Fb +f
where
P is the worker's productivity without training
g is the increment in productivity due to general training
h is the increment in productivity at the firm due to specific training
fO is the random factor in productivity in this firm which captures one
element of the quality of the match at the training firm
WI, W2 are the first and second period wages at the firm
U(g)+f is the utility of the best alternative job if one leaves
voluntarily. This depends on the amount of general skill and a
random factor which measures from the worker's point of view the
quality of the firm-worker match at the alternative firm relative
to the match at the training firm.
T is the costs of transition if the change in jobs is initiated by the
worker: moving costs, reputational damage from having the quit
signal on one's resume, lost income while waiting for the next
job to start.
Fb the additional transition costs imposed on the worker over and above
T, if the exit is involuntary: the additional damage to the
worker's reputation from being permanently laid off or fired
rather than leaving voluntarily, the lost income due to the wait
until another job is found.
Turnover decisions are made in two stages. At the end of the first
period, the worker makes the first move by deciding whether to quit or to
express an intention to stay. If the worker quits, he/she obtains a job which
offers a utility level of U(g)+T+f. The worker but not his employer learns
about f at the end of the first period.
Then the firm decides whether to keep or dismiss the worker by comparing
the second period wage to the worker's productivity in the firm, P+g+h+f. If
the worker's productivity is less than the second period wage, the firm will
dismiss the worker. The random factor fO is a measure of the quality of the
firm-worker match at the current firm. If the worker is dismissed at this
9stage he/she will be forced to look for work while unemployed and will incur
an additional transition cost of Fb' Therefore, the worker's first stage
decision will take into account the risk of involuntary turnover in the second
stage.
At the beginning of the first period neither the worker nor the firm
knows the worker's exact productivity in this firm and in other firms.
firm offers wage package (Wl,W2) based on information obtained in the,
interview and from references and the nature of uncertainties involved, i.e.
The
the probabliity density function's of EO and E. In the first period, the firm
trains the worker, taking into account the possible loss of the investment due
to a separation in the next period. Training investment takes two forms,
investment in firm specific skills and general skills. General training
increases the wage that the worker can obtain in alternative employment as
well as his productivity in this firm. Workers accept the job offer from this
firm if the wage package and training plan are generous enough to attract
workers in a competitive labor market. In deciding, the worker takes account
of possible gains or losses from a voluntary or involuntary separation.
assume the worker and the firm have the same prior distributions on the
We
uncertainties surrounding the worker's productivity in this firm and worker's
income opportunity outside the firm in the second period.
that both the firm and the worker are risk neutral.
The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted sum of profit from the
two periods by< choosing wage rates in two periods, WI and W2, and an amount of
general training, g, and specific training, h, subject to the constraint that
Further, we assume
the wage offer and amount of training are generous enough to attract new hires
in a competitive labor market. The firm's expected profit maximization
problem when E and EO are independent is written as:
(1) M~ P
- C(g,h) - WI + °a[Pr(S)Pr(K)(P+g+h+E(EoIK)-W2)]
g, h, WI, W2
Subject to the constraint
(2) R ~ WI +
°b(Pr(S)Pr(K)W2 + (l-Pr(S»(U-T+E(EIQ» + Pr(S)(l-Pr(K»(U-T+E(EIS)-Fb)]
I
\
I
I
i
f
I
I
10
or R ~ y1 + Sb [Pr(S)Pr(K){y2 - U + T - E(f IS) - 1-Pr(K)F ) + U -T ]Pr(K) b
where
E(fOIK) is the conditional expectation of fO given that the firm wishes
to keep the worker.
E(f
I
Q) is the conditional expectation of f given that the worker quits
the firm.
E(fIS) is the conditional expectation of f given the worker wishes to
stay in the firm. E(fIS) < O.
Sa and Sb are the discount factors of the firm and worker, respectively
PreS) is the prior probability the worker is willing to stay with
the firm
Pr(K) is the prior probability the firm is willing to keep the worker
R is the level of expected utility the worker can attain in the
competitive labor market.
At the end of the first period, the worker learns what utility can be
obtained by taking a job at another firm.
worker's decision rule is:
Based on this information, the
STAY IF Pr(K)W2 + (l-Pr(K»(U-T-Fb+f) > U - T + f
The right hand side of the inequality is the utility level of the alternative
job. It is affected by the amount of general training that other employers
perceive the worker to have obtained, g, and the costs of making a voluntary
transition, (T), and the random term, (f), which captures the worker's
relative evaluation of two jobs. The left hand side of the inequality is the
expected income if he/she wishes to stay at the firm. Note that the expected
income of choosing to stay takes into account the risk of being fired or laid
off and suffering the additional transition costs (Fb) that involuntary
turnover imposes on the worker. The probability of a worker wishing to stay
in the firm, PreS), is:
(3) Pr e S ) - Pr ( f
-
< w2 - U +T - 1-pr(K)F )Pr(K) b
-
m(w2 - U T - l-Pr(K) F )
'I' + Pr(K) b
where <p is the cumulative density function of f.
11
Note that the argument for the cumulative density funtion, ~, contains the
term
-
l-pr(K)F
b which is minus the odds of bein g laid off or fired times thePr(K)
,
additional transition costs, Fb' that result from involuntary turnover. This
implies that if a worker believes there is a high probability of being laid
off or fired, he is more likely to quit.
By the end of the first period, the firm knows the worker's productivity
in the second period and whether the worker wants to stay. It then lays off
or fires the worker if P+g+h+€o is less than the second period wage.
Consequently, Pr(K) is written as
(4) Pr(K) - Pr(P+g+h+€o > W2)
- 1 - ~o(W2_p-g-h)
where
~o is the cumulative density function of EO.
Denoting the probability density function of € and €o by ~ and
order condition for the second period wage is written as:
~o the first
(5) 0 - Oa[a~~~S).pr(K)Ga - Pr(S)Pr(K)] + °b[Pr(S)Pr(K) - ~oPr(S)Gb]
where Ga and Gb are defined as
Qa - P + g + h + E(€oIK) - W2 > 0,
~ -
W2
-
(U(g)
- T - Fb + E(€IS»
apr~S)
- ~(l-v)aw
v JO- 2F -3:kfb-- Pr(K) b - Pr(K)
> o.
~k - the elasticity of the firm's keep rate, pr(K)2 with respect to the
2nd period wage times minus one.
~k - ~oW jPr(K) > O.
fb - Fb/W2 is the ratio of the transition cost if fired to the 2nd period
wage.
Qa is the firm's expected profit on workers who want to stay with the firm and
which the firm wants to keep. Alternatively, it is the employer's share of
2nd period quasi-rents. Qb is the gain the worker receives from not bein~
dismissed or alternatively the worker's share of 2nd period quasi rents. It is
the difference between the second period wage, W2, and expected utility if
II
!
I
l
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dismissed, (U(g)-T-Fb+E(fIS)). Note that ~0/Pr(K)2 is the derivative of the
odds of being kept with respect to the second period wage. An increase in the
second period wage has two effects on the worker's decision to stay. The
direct effect increases the desire to stay. The second effect is that it
raises the odds of being permanently laid off or fired and incurring the added
transition costs Fb' While this second effect lowers the probability of
staying, we may reasonably assume that the total effect of a wage increase on
Pr(S) is positive,( i.e. O<v<l ) because the elasticity of the keep rate, ~k,
is not likely to exceed 1 and the extra transition cost of an involuntary
termination is probably less than 20 percent of the 2nd period wage.
The first order conditions for specific and general training (h and g)
are given by (6) and (7).
(6) Ch - °aPr(K) [Pr(S) + (8Pr(S)/8h)Qa] + °bPr(S)~oQb
where Ch - 8C/8h, 8Pr(S)/8h - ~v,
(7) Cg - °aPr(K) [Pr(S) + (8Pr(S)/8g)Qa] + °b[(l-Pr(K)Pr(S))Ug + ~oPr(S)Qb]
where Cg - 8C/8g, Ug - 8U/8g, 8Pr(S)/8g - ~(-Ug+v)
These conditions can be more simply represented by:
(6') Ch - °aPr(SK)[1 + ~svqa] + obPr(SK)~kqb
(7') Cg - °aPr(SK)[I + ~s(-Ug+v)qa] + °b[(l-Pr(SK))Ug + Pr(SK)~kqb]
where
Pr(SK) = Pr(S)Pr(K) is the probability the worker is at the firm in the
second period
qa - Qa;W2, the ratio of the firm's quasi rent to the 2nd period wage
qb - Qb;W2, the ratio of the worker's quasi rent to the 2nd period wage
~s - the elasticity of the worker's stay rate with respect to the 2nd
period wage.
~s - ~(1-v)W2/Pr(S) > O.
Also the optimal wage in the first period, WI, ~s determined so that the
constraint (2) is binding. The first order conditions--(5), (6), (7) and (2)
with equality constraint--characterize the optimal wage-training package the
firm will offer. In what follows, we examine the economic implications of
these conditions.
Choosing the Wage Structure
l13
The understanding of what determines y2 will be aided by specifying the
income opportunity outside the firm, U(g) + E, in more detail.
in the following form:
Ye write U(g)
(8) U(g) - P + g
where P is the productivity of the worker without the general training
received in the first period and g is the increment to the wage offer due to
general training. Employers use the interview and the reputation of the
previous employer to predict the true value of the general training. The
estimate by other employers of the productivity gain due to the original
firm's general training is g.
Other potential employers cannot observe the exact amount of human
capital that is produced by the training. The signal that provides
information on the level of training contains a good deal of noise. Denoting
the signal that other employers receive by g, we assume the following
relation:
(9) g
-
g + u
where u is a noise independent of g.
Given the signal, g, other firms predict the true level of general skill.
Under the quadratic loss function, the best linear predictor of general skill,
A .g ~s:
(10) g
- E(gIJ) + P(g-E(gIJ» - E(gIJ) + P[g-E(gIJ)] + pu
where E(gIJ) is the conditional mean of general human capital of the
particular class of job seekers given information set J. J represents
occupation, industry, and firm size of the previous job and background
characteristics of the individual. Therefore, Ug is given by
(11)U P var(gIJ)g - - var(gIJ)+var(u) < 1,
where var(gIJ) is the conditional variance cof g given J (see Leamer pp. 51-
55). This implies that a unit increase of general skill results in less than
proportional increases in other firms' wage offers.
Substituting (8) into the first order condition for y2, rearranging terms
and making use of the assumption that competitive equilibrium implies that the
expected profit from hiring the marginal worker is zero, the optimal wage
(12) W2
- [P+h+g+E(€oIK)] - 9[h +(g-g) +T +Fb +E(€oIK) -E(€IS)]
,j
I'
r) r-f \
i y~l{If
'-"
I
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ila.:..2.blEl-
-
°a'Ys+oa"Yk
rates for the two periods may be written as follows:
(13) WI
- P - C(g,h) + °aPr(S)Pr(K) (9[h+(g-g)+T+Fb+E(€0IK)-E(€ IS)] +~a.:..2.blEZ}
°a"Ys+ob"Yk
where 9 - Jb.:lk-
°a"Ys+ob"Yk
is the employer's share of the costs of specific human
capital investments and of quasi rents.
Equation (12) implies that the expected profit from the worker staying with
the firm is positive. Since in long run equilibrium, competition among firms
brings the expected profit of the firm to zero, the wage rate in the first
period must be higher than the worker's productivity net of training cost by a
compensating amount. Thus our model predicts that in the early stage of
employment, productivity net of training cost grows faster than the wage rate.
The firm's net profit is negative in the investment period but the loss is
compensated in the second period when the firm receives the return from human
capital investment.
The wage offer in the second period is the expected productivity of the
worker, P+g+h+E(€oIK), less the second and third terms in (12). The
expression in the second set of brackets is the difference (for those who are
kept and want to stay) between the worker's productivity in the firm,
P+g+h+E(€oIK),' and the utility of the worker's best alternative job if he/she
is laid off or fired, P+~-T-Fb+E(€IS). The second term indicates that given
the value of 9, the following factors reduce the firm's second period wage
offer (and also raise the firm's first period wage offer):
-- Transition costs if the exit is voluntary, (T)
-- The additional transition costs of the worker resulting from being
laid off or fired, (Fb)
-- The difference between a worker's true general human capital, g, and
other employer's perception of his general human capital, g. (This
could be positive or negative depending upon whether the firm provides
more or less general training than is average for that occupation and
industry) and
-- The average unattractiveness of alternative employment for workers who
want to stay, (-E(€IS».
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Anything that raises productivity in the firm but does not raise it
outside the firm, will raise the second period wage at the firm. The wage
increase is smaller than the rise in productivity, so the firm's profit on the
worker in the second period goes up. The two factors that will produce this
effect are:
-- Specific human capital, (h); and
-- The firm's expected gain from having the option of dismissing less
productive workers, (E(£oIK)).
Also, other things being equal, second period wage offer declines if e, the
employer's share of quasi rents, is increased. Factors that makes e larger
are:
-- The wage elasticity of the keep rate increases relative to the
elasticity of the worker's willingness to stay at the firm. (ie.
large relative to 1s). This could be caused by
~o being large
relative to ~ or by v being close to 1.
1k is
High incremental transition costs when turnover is involuntary, (Fb),
result in workers becoming so fearful of dismissals that they prefer
contracts in which employers finance a larger share of firm specific
investments so as to reduce their risks of dismissal. If Fb is large
relative to W2, v becomes larger.
-- The worker's valuation of future earnings grows relative to the
firm's valuation. (ie. ob/oa becomes larger).
Workers have poorer access to capital markets than employers and also
tend to face hfgher marginal tax rates during the payoff period than the
training period. The third term of (12) and (13) represents the effects of
their consequent tendency to discount future returns more heavily than
employers. Since the error term in the quit relationship does not have a
degenerate distribution, the supply of trained labor is not infinitely
elastic. Bloch (1979) cross section analysis of turnover in 49 manufacturing
industries, for example, found wage elasticities of -1.3 for quit rates and
.85 for the layoff rates when the lagged accession rate was included in the
model. The supply of untrained labor," however, is assumed to be infinitely
elastic at R. New hires take second period wages into account when evaluating
the firm's job offer, however, so the decline in the elasticity of labor
supply with the worker's tenure influences the wage structure only when the
firm and its workers discount the future at different rates. The compensation
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packages reflect the worker's preference for compensation now rather than
later. Thus, the third term of (12) and (13) implies that the firm's second
period wage will be reduced and the first period wage increased to the extent
that:
The firm's discount factor is large relative to the worker's discount
factor, (oa-ob is large).
-- The elasticities of the worker's stay rate, 1s, and of the firm's keep
rate, 1k. with respect to the firm's second period wage are small.
Choosing the Level of Training
The first order condition for specific capital, (6'), says that the
marginal cost of investment in specific capital is equated to the marginal
discounted revenue to the firm, the discount factor times the retention rate
and the marginal increase in the stay rate resulting from the reduced
probability of being terminated involuntarily times the share of the second
period wage that is a quasi rent for the employer, (oaPr(SK)[1 + 1~vqa]}' plus
the discounted marginal benefit to the worker of the specific training. The
benefit of specific training to the worker is captured by the second term of
(6'). The increased productivity makes the firm less likely to dismiss the
worker. This effect is captured by 1k, the elasticity of the keep rate with
respect to the, second period wage. In (6') 1k is multiplied by qb, the share
of the second period wage that is a quasi rent for the worker.
The first order condition for general training, (7 or 7') characterizes
the optimal amount of general training. The marginal cost of general training
is equated to the discounted marginal revenue to the firm plus the discounted
marginal benefit to the worker. The marginal revenue to the firm from general
training has two elements. The first element is the marginal product of a
dollar of expenditure on general training for the workers who are going to
stay with the firm (Pr(S)Pr(K». Th~ second element measures the loss the
firm is likely to experience because with given y2, quit rates will rise. The
higher level of general skill implies better alternative income opportunities
for the worker. For a given second period wage, quits will rise by ~(Ug-v).
Per quit, the loss the firm experiences is Pr(K)Ga--the probability the firm
wants to keep the worker times the quasi rent received by the firm from those
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workers it keeps.
The marginal benefit of general training to the worker also has two
elements. The first element is that, given he or she is leaving the firm,
(voluntarily or involuntarily) general training increases the wage offer in
other employment. The second element reflects the fact that the increased
productivity makes the firm less likely to dismiss the worker. This benefits
the worker, and the amount of the benefit is the worker's quasi rent (Qb)
multiplied by the probability that the individual wants to stay, (Pr(S). The
worker benefit of reduced risks of dismissal tends to offset the loss the
employer experiences from the quits that are induced by the rise in other
firm's wage offers.~
Substituting the first order conditions for W2 and ~= Ug and rearranging
terms, the condition describing the equilibrium level of general human capital
is:
~ (1-8)(14) Cg - °aPr(SK)(l-v) +
°b~ + obPr(SK)(l-v) (7kqb - v)
Equation (14) implies that investment in general OJT increases with the
firm's and the worker's discount factor (oa and °b) and the retention rate,
and decreases if the marginal cost schedule shifts up. The derivative of Cg
with respect to v is given by:
(15)
~~g - (oa - Ob[l(l:~(qb- p;~K~]}p~~~~~~i:~~~k + [Oa+Ob(7k-V)]~i:~~aP~~SK)
Thus an increase in the cost of firing causes increased investment in both
general and specific human capital primarily because of its tendency to reduce
turnover.
If other firms fully perceive the quality of training provided by the
firm (~=1), the condition reduces to setting the marginal cost of training
(Cg) equal to °b, the worker's discount. factor. If other firms cannot
perceive differentials in training quality (~- 0), the condition becomes
identical to that for specific human capital. The inability of other firms to
perceive all of the firm to firm variations in the amount of general human
capital has the effect of dividing the marginal returns to general human
capital into two parts. The share of the marginal increase in skill that the
worker is assured of getting whether or not he/she stays at the firm (~) is
discounted by the worker's rate of time preference. The share that is
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perceived only by the firm that provides the training (1-~) is depreciated by
the retention rate and discounted by the'emp1oyer's internal rate of return.
Improvements in the signals of general training (i.e. an increase in ~) will
increase investment in general training if:
(16) aCg
a~
-
°b - Oa~~~~~) - ObP~i~~~~k(qb- P;~K~ + [Oa+Ob(~k-V)]~i~~~
ap~~SK)
is greater than zero. This expression will tend to be greater than zero when
new hires have high turnover rates, the worker's discount factor (Ob) is not
much smaller than the employer's discount factor (oa) and an increase in the
visibility of the training to other employers does not lower the retention
rate by very much. On the other hand, if turnover rates are not high, worker
discount factors are a small fraction of employer discount factors and
retention rates drop significantly when training becomes more visible, the
inequality is likely to be reversed and an increase in the quality of the
signals of skills learned will decrease investment in general OJT.
IV. The Magnitude of Transition Costs
and the Prevalence of Liquidity Constrained Workers
In most matches between a worker and a firm there is a substantial
difference between the average productivity of workers who stick with the firm
and the expected utility of alternative employment of those who wish to stay
at the firm but are nevertheless terminated involuntarily. This difference,
the quasi rent 'associated with the match, is given by the expression:
(17) Quasi Rent - [h + T + Fb + E(foIK) - E(fIS)] - Qa + Qb
By sharing these quasi rents, both parties try to induce the other to maintain
the contract. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th terms inside the bracketed expression
are often quite large. Even when training is entirely general (h=O) , this
makes it optimal for the firm to pay wages which exceed productivity minus
training costs in the first period and to offer a wage in the second period
which is correspondingly lower than productivity in the second period. In
effect, the firm pays part of the costs of general training and the rate of
wage growth is considerably below the rate of growth of productivity net of
training costs.
Transition Costs-Job Search and Reputations
The substantive importance of the points just made depends on just how
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large the transition costs, T and Fb, are. The transition cost T is in part
adjustment costs such as moving costs and the unhappiness resulting from
losing friendships at work. A second reason why T is expected to be positive
is that, for most workers, a quit damages one's reputation. A quit after a
short time on the job is likely to be interpreted as a signal of problems that
may recur, a lack of commitment to ones's job or a high quit propensity.
Hollenbeck and Smith's (1984) study of employer reactions to resumes found
that the number of quits in the job history had a large negative effect on the
rating assigned to the job app1icant.5
The third term of the quasi rent expression, Fb, is the additional costs
associated with involuntary terminations. Such terminations are very costly
for the worker because (1) finding another job takes a great deal of time and
is psychologically stressful and (2) a discharge does even more damage to a
worker's reputation than a quit. Involuntarily terminated workers seldom
have another job lined up so they immediately enter the ranks of the
unemployed. Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) have calculated that the expected
length of a spell of unemployment was 10.3 weeks in 1980-81 for the household
heads in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data. Using 1974 CPS data, Clark
and Summers (1979) calculated that if unemployed workers did not leave the
labor force, it took on average 12.6 weeks for teenagers to find another job
and 16.2 for those over 20 years of age to find another job. Blau and Robins'
(1985) analysis of longitudinal data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot
Projects found that it took on average 25 to 36 weeks for unemployed welfare
recipients to find a job and 15 to 20 weeks for unemployed workers not on
welfare to find a job.6 If the termination is a dismissal or a layoff
occurring after only a few months on the job, the individual may not be
eligible for unemployment insurance. These costs are the natural consequences
of involuntary turnover. They have not been generated by a bonding contract.
When they find another job, it typically pays less. In the National
Longitudinal Survey, young men who changed employers between 1967 and 1973
subsequent to an involuntary separation experienced a 3 percent decline in
their wage rate over the two year measurement period. For the mature men's
sample the wage decline was 10 percent. These effects appear to persist for
many years. Models were estimated in which dummies for a separation between
1969 and 1971 were used to predict wage growth during 1967-69 and 1971-73 as
lI
f
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well as for 1969-71. The workers who were involuntarily terminated between
1969 and 1971 experienced a sharp deceleration in their wage growth which
persisted into 1971-73 (Bartel and Borjas 1981). Analyzing a five year time
interval in PSID data, Ruhm (1987) found that involuntary terminations lowered
the wage growth of male household heads by 13.6 percent but had no significant
effect on the wage growth of female household heads. These wage reductions
arise partly because the individual's specific human capital is now worthless,
partly because of Lazear type bonding contracts (if they do indeed exist for
young workers) and partly because quits and dismissals are signals which
damage the worker's reputation.
The unemployment durations and wage reductions reported above are for all
involuntarily terminated workers as a group. While no study reported separate
estimates of the effects of discharges and layoffs, one suspects that those
discharged experience longer spells of unemployment and bigger wage declines
than those laid off. M~employers contact a job candidate's previous
employers prior to making a final hiring decision and are, therefore, ~
~find out about the discharge. If the job seeker does not include the
/
employer who discharged him in his employment history, there is a long stretch
of nonemployment that must somehow be explained. Discharged employees are
reported to be 25 percent less productive than the workers who end up staying
with a firm for a year or more (Bishop 1988). In some cases this productivity
disadvantage is specific to the match, but it is difficult for other employers
to assess whether that is the case so if they know a job applicant was fired
by a previous employer, they are unlikely to hire himjher.
Since the costs of an involuntary termination are so severe, job seekers
would be expected to prefer employers and employment contracts which minimize
risks of discharge and layoff and which promise that bad recommendations will
not be given. Promises not to give bad oral recommendations are not
enforceable, however, so the worker's only recourse is to seek contracts which
minimize the risk of dismissal and layoff. Seniority protection, grievance
procedures and enforceable promises to dismiss a worker only after certain
procedures are followed are one way to accomplish this but in nonunion
settings there are always ways of forcing an unwanted employee out. A more
reliable way of reducing the risk of dismissal and layoff is to have the
employer put up a bond which is forfeited if the worker is laid off or
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dismissed. Workers, therefore, prefer emp10ymen~.~~~~acts containing a front
loaded compensation package in which the employe~~s ~ al~the costs of
A
specific training and contributes toward the costs of general training. There
are, of course, countervailing forces such as the desire to reduce the number
of trained employees who quit, so the form of the contract depends on how the
various forces balance out.
The fourth and fifth terms of the bracketed expression capture the effect
of sorting on the quasi rent.1 As the worker and the firm learn more about
the quality of the match, the unsuccessful matches tend to be terminated. The
workers who discover that they do not like the job or that they have better
opportunities elsewhere quit and the workers who are the least productive on
the job are fired or induced to quit. Thus, even when training develops only
general skills and there are no transition costs, the expectation of the
difference between the productivity of workers who stick with the firm and
their evaluation of the next best a1ternative--the quasi rent attached to the
match--is considerably greater for long tenure workers than for recent hires.~
Sorting's effect on average productivity has been estimated to be at least 2.6
percent between the fourth and seventeenth month on the job at small and
medium sized non-union firms (Bishop 1988). Sorting is also generated by
differences in tastes for the nonpecuniary features of a job and differences
in alternative opportunities. Consequently, sorting probably causes quasi
rents equal to 4 to 8 percent of yearly compensation. Transition costs
probably generate quasi rents equal to another 5 or 10 percent of
compensation.~ The growth of these quasi rents during the first year causes
wage growth to diverge from the growth of productivity net of training cost.
If (T + Fb + E(£oIK) - E(£IS)] is 10 percent of compensation in the second
period, a 8 (the employer's share of specific investments) of .S-implies that
second period wages are reduced by 5 percent and a 8 of .8 implies they are
reduced by 8 percent. If the investment and payoff periods are of equal
length, wage growth will be 8[1 + °aPr(S)Pr(K)](.lO) less than the growth of
productivity net of training costs. With a discount factor of .9, a retention
ratio of .7, wages rise 8.1 percent less than productivity net of training
costs when 8 is .5 and rise 13.1 percent less when 8 is .8. If the payoff
period is twice as long as the investment period, the reduction in percentage
growth is 11.2 percent when e is .5 and 18.3 percent when e is .8. Clearly,
22
transition costs and sorting effects can have significant effects on the time
pattern of compensation in the first year or so of a job.
Liauidity Constraints
The second force tending to lower wage growth below the growth of
productivity net of training costs is the fact that many workers are liquidity
constrained while their employers are not.i The young workers who have the
greatest need for general training are the
Half of households headed by someone under
in financial assets and 19 percent have no
most likely to be constrained.
the age of 25 have less than $746.
financial assets at all. Half of
households headed by someone between 25 and 34 have less than $1514 in
financial assets and 13 percent have none (Survey of Consumer Finances 1984).
Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not available to finance on-the-job
training and banks will not lend money for this purpose without collateral.
Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a possibility for some but only
34 percent of households with heads under the age of 35 own a home and many of
the houses have been owned for only a short while)so the equity that can be
borrowed against is small. Even with collateral, the loan will be at an
interest rate that exceeds the interest rates charged businesses. Studies of
the willingness of consumers to substitute consumption over time have all
concluded that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is no higher than
one and most studies conclude it is .5 or below (Friend and Blume 1975; Hall
1988; Hubbard and Judd 1986). A substitution elasticity of .5 implies that
reducing a liq~idity constrained worker's wage by one half (in order to pay
for general training) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal utility of
consumption. Such a worker would be willing to give up four dollars of future
income in return for one dollar of current income. The liquidity constraint
phenomenon has no effect on the wage profile of jobs with no on-the-job
training and which, therefore, have a flat productivity profile. Where
significant general training is occurring, however, it comes very much into
play and tends to result in an employment contract in which the employer
shares the costs of general training.
To properly represent the liquidity constraint phenomenon just described,
in a formal model, an intertemporal utility function should be maximized
subject to a borrowing constraint. This, however, so complicates the
presentation of the other results of the model, it was decided to make the
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much simpler assumption that workers have access to the capital market but at
a substantially higher interest rate than firms.
Pro&ressive Taxation
In addition, the progressive nature of the personal income tax means that
workers face higher marginal tax rates on the fruits of training investments
than they are paying when they incur the costs of such investments. Firms, on
the other hand, train continuously, so the marginal tax rates faced when the
costs of training are incurred and expensed are no different from those faced
during the payoff period.
These two factors result in firms being more willing than workers to
trade off future earnings for present earnings. The compensation packages
that result from the aSYmmetric access to capital markets and the progressive
tax structure reflect the worker's strong preference for compensation now
rather than later. If, for example,
°Et - .9, ok - .75 and both 1a and 1b - 1,
the second period wage is reduced by 9.1 percent. If the two time periods are
of equal length, the first period wage is increased by 5.7 percent and wage
growth is reduced by 14.8 percent. If the wage elasticity of keep rates and
stay rates is doubled to 2, then the wage growth effect is cut in half to 7.4
percent. If the payoff period is double the length of the investment period,
the wage growth is reduced by 20.5 percent when wage elasticities, 1a and 1P,
are land 10.2 when wage elasticities are 2. In effect, firms offer new hires
a loan that will be canceled if a separation occurs. Firms do not require
repayment of the loan when separations occur for the same reasons that banks
do not offer large unsecured loans without a government guarantee of payment.
The administrative costs of obtaining repayment are extremely high and
bankruptcy is a real option for someone with zero assets.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Becker's statement that the employee
general on-the-job training is apparently
been presented in which 'employers find it
must always pay the full costs of
not necessarily true. A model has
in their interest to front load
compensation and thereby share the costs of general training. This occurs
because liquidity constraints prevent workers from financing their own general
training without unacceptably large reductions in consumption and because
sources of job-worker match specificity unrelated to training such as sorting,
costs of finding a new job and the reputational damages of turnover results in
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workers strongly prefering front loaded compensation packages.
If these conclusions are true, turnover becomes a much more important
determinant of training investments than previously thought. In the standard
model, a worker's propensity for turnover influences the amount of specific
training supplied but not the amount of general training that is undertaken.
If employers are financing some of the costs of general training, however,
worker's with high turnover propensities are likely to find it hard to obtain
jobs that offer general as well as specific training. The high rates of
turnover of American youth probably help explain why investments in both
specific and general on-the-job training are lower in this country than in
Japan and Germany where turnover rates are considerably lower. Turnover rates
are endogenous, however. If specific training were increased, they would go
down. Mincer and Higuchi (1988) suggest that the heavy training investment in
Japan is due to its high rate of productivity growth. While this is certainly
a contributing factor, high rates of productivity growth are a consequence as
well as a cause of training investment. One must look outside the turnover-
specific training-productivity growth feedback loops to find the ultimate
causes of the low levels of investment in training in the US relative to Japan
and West Germany.
The theory outlined above suggests a number of possible causes for the
descrepancies. The most obvious explanation of the heavier investment in
training by Japanese corporations is the very low costs of capital they face
(Japanese 6a's'are higher than American 6a's). The fact that Japanese
companies operating in the US spend more on training than American companies
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in the same industry is support for this hypothesis (Mincer and Higuchi 1988).
A second possible explanation is that the Japanese workers are better educated
and consequently faster learners (eg. Cg and Ch are lower in Japan).
A third potential cause of the difference is national differences in the
variance of f and fO or in the mean levels of T and Fb that result in major
differences in turnover propensities. One of the .most important determinants
of these two varaiances is how well informed the employer and the worker are
when the match is ~first arranged. If they know alot about each other,
their will be few surprises, so the variances of f and fo will be small.
Japanese companies invest much more in the selection of their blue collar
employees than American companies (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1987; Koenig 1987). In
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the US their are major institutional barriers to the free flow of information
about job applicants--such as EEO testing guidelines, the reluctance of high
schools to send out transcripts and the threat of suit if bad recommendations
are given. This results in large variances for E and EO' high turnover and
reduced incentives to invest in both general and specific training.
Transition costs might also be higher in some countries than others. In
Germany lay offs are not strickly based on seniority. Job performance is an
important determinant of who is laid off, so laid off workers become
stigmatised (ie Fb is high). The best Japanese employers hire straight out of
high school and are said to discriminate against those with work experience.
The reverse prevails in the US. Quitting is probably much less stigmatizing
in the US than in Japan. If these characterizations are correct, lower
turnover is the result and this in turn raises the payoff to employer
investments in both specific and general training and this in turn contributes
the high productivity growth rates of Japan and Germany.
An important reason why employers in Germany, Austria and Switzerland
invest more heavily in employer training than in the US is their strong
apprenticeship systems. The standardized curriculums and the proficiency exam
at the end of the apprenticeship mean that the quality and nature of the
training is well signaled to employers. The result is that the worker can
count on benefiting from doing a good job in their apprenticeship even if the
training employer does not keep them on. Since the future payoff is certain,
German apprentices are Wil~ng to start out at a wage that is only about one-
quarter of the wage they will be able to command at the end of the
apprenticeship. If the apprentices were adults, they could not afford to
accept so Iowa wage. They are teenagers, however, who by living at home are
heavily subsidized by their parents. Consequently, the liquidity constraint
that is such a barrier to heavy investments in general trainng in the US is
much less of a problem in Germany.
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Footnotes
1. Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his
1962 paper. "Since employer specific skills are part of the intangible
assets or good will of firms and can be offered as collateral along with
tangible assets, capital would be more readily available for specific
than for general investments (p.42)." He did not, however, explicitly
analyze how such constraints might influence the tenure profile of wages
and thus induce employers to share the costs of general training.
Parsons (1972) points out that "The worker's ., .discount rate will affect
the firm's choice of wage policies It can be shown that firms will
decrease the worker's share of specific investment as the workers
discount the future more heavily (p.1129)."
~. Included in the array were: achievement test scores, GPA, dummies for
an A or B grade in business and trade courses, an indicator of deportment
in high school, the number of vocational credits, the number of academic
credits, hours spent in homework, hours spent in jobs for pay, hours
spent watching TV, the number of leadership roles, number of
extracurricular activities, attitudes toward school work and working for
pay, time spent reading for pleasure, a proxy for study habits, self
esteem, internal locus of control, a dummy for dropped out during the
senior year and the standard set of family background variables--parental
income, education, and occupation and number of siblings. Also included
among the controls were two dummy variables for handicapping conditions,
dummies for currently in the active duty military or the reserves, and
five variables describing college attendance since leaving high school.
The only characteristics of the job included in the models were the
number of different types of training received, total hours of such
training, its square, total months in the job and its square.
~. In the adverse selection models of Salop and Salop (1976) and Nickell
(1976) workers'have information not available to firms on how likely they
are to quit, so since turnover is costly, some employers attempt to
attract those with low quit probabilities by imposing a hiring fee
(through a below market starting wage) and raising the wage level in
subsequent periods. The equilibrium wage pattern results in the worker
paying all the costs and receiving all the benefits of investments in
specific human capital and in wage rates which rise in step with gains in
productivity net of training costs.
i. Studies of quit and layoff rates obtain wage elasticity estimates that
range between 2 and .3 (Ehrenberg and Smith 1987; Bishop 1981 Chapter 8).
This implies that the elasticities of stay and keep rates are even lower
and that Oa1s(-Ug+v)qa and °b1kqb are small.
5. The existence of these transition costs helps explain why so few
jobseekers take stopgap jobs while they search for work and why so few
new hires continue their job search after having accepted a job offer.
Search theory attributes this behavior to increases in search costs when
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one becomes employed. For some labor markets this explanation rings
true, but in so many cases the unemployed worker spends so little time in
active search, it is hard to see how having a 40 hour a week job can
substantially interfere with search of such low intensity. It is
possible, however, for reputational effects to operate in the opposite
direction (ie. for T to be negative). Taking a very prestigious job [ego
an Assistant Professor position at MIT] may so enhance reputation and
improve contacts that the distribution of job offers will shift up.
Employers whose reputation is such that taking a job there enhances the
worker's marketability can achieve target compensation levels, R, at
lower cost and will typically find it optimal to backload their
compensation package.
G. For most jobs, the firm's expected costs of recruiting and selecting a
replacement if there is an unanticipated quit are considerably smaller
than a worker's costs of finding another job if terminated involuntarily.
When small and medium sized firms hire for a nonsupervisory position,
they consider on average only nine applications, interview only five of
the applicants and devote a total of only 10 hours of staff time to the
task of filling one position. New positions are filled an average of 16
days after beginning the search. In 55 percent of the cases the firm had
advance notice of the opening and so the job was not uncovered during
much of the search.
1. The sorting effect may be thought of as the return to investment in
information about the quality of the match. The firm learns about the
trainability and productivity of the employee and the worker learns about
conditions of work, the friendliness of coworkers and the quality of
supervision and training and about hisfher talent and taste for the work.
After this information generates some separations, the employer and
remaining workers receive a return on their investment in match specific
knowledge.
g. Assuming a yearly
°a - .75, unemployment spells of one-third of a year
and a DI replacement rate of .4, the ratio of the search costs resulting
from an involuntary termination to the present discounted value of future
wage payments is (1-.4)*.333/[1/(1-.75)] - .05. The wage reduction that
results from an involuntary termination is in part due to the signal that
it transmits. It would not be unreasonable for this signaling effect to
lower the worker's wage in subsequent jobs by 5 percent.
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APPENDIX. DERIVATION
Derivatives of Probabitities
with respect to w2:
oPr(K}/ow2 :: -~o oPr(S}/oW2 :: ~'(l - ~ F):: ~(l-v)
Pr(K}2 b
with respect to ~:
OPr(K)/og :: ~o oPr(S)/og ::
~'(-U + ~ Fb
):: ;(-Ug + v)g Pr(K)2
with respect to h:
oPr(K)/oh :: ~o oPr(S)/oh = +.(~ Fb) = +v
Pr(K)2
Derivatives of the Conditional Expectations
E(e.Ol.!U
CD
Definition: E(e.OIK) = J 2 t+O(t}dt / Pr(K)
W-P-g-h
2
2 -(W -P-g-h}~O J t+Odt oPr(K)
oE(e.OIK}/oW :: 2 2Pr(K} Pr(K) oW
;0
=-Q
Pr(K} a
+0 2
= - [-(W -P-g-h}+E(e. IK})
Pr(K) 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
oE(e.oIK}
'0
oW2
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pr(K)Qa
oE(E.oIK)
'0::--(l
og Pr(K} a
oE(E.oIK) +0
- - .
oh - Pr(K} a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
E(e.ls)
",2 -U+T_I-Pr( K) F
Definition: E(e.IS} = f' Pr(K) b t.;(t)dt / pr(S}
_CD
2
oE(e.IS}/oW2:: {{W -U+T -(l-Pr(K»/Pr(K)'Fb};
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. 2 .
= {W -UtT-(l-Pr(K»/Pr(K)'Fb- E(~IS)}'(l-v) = ~(l-v)
PreS) PreS)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8E(~IS)
= ~ ~(l-v)
oE(~IS)
= ~ ~(-U tv)
oW2 PreS) cg PreS)
g
oE(~IS)
= ~ ~*'vdh pr(S) U
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Differentiationof (*) Pr(S)Pr(K)'G
a
2(Ga = r+g+h+E(~OIK)-W )
~ fO
oQ /oW2 =
0
~ - 1 o~ /og = 1 -- Q
a FrnIT '"B. R Pr( K) """'a
w.r.t. W2
4'0
oQ loh
= 1 - ~a Pr(K) a
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2 . .0
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{oPr(S)/oW 'Pr(K) - ;OPr(S)}~ t Pr(S)'Pr(K)(~~ - 1)a ..r\n./a
=
oPr(S)/oW2'Pr(K)'Q - Pr(S)'Pr(K)
a
w.r.t. ~
oPr(S)/og'Pr(K)'~ + Pr(S)'Pr(K)
w.r.t. h
oPr(S)/oh'Pr(K)'~ t Pr(S)'Pr(K)
Differentiation of (**) Pr(S)Pr(K)~*
u
2 ~(Gb= W -U+T-E(~IS)-(l-Pr(K»/Pr(K)'Fb = ~ - PrTKT)
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PreS) Pr(S)
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2 2 ~{oPr(S)/aw -Pr(K) + oPr(K)/oW -Pr(S)}-~ + Pr(S)Pr(K)-(l-v)(l - Gt)
Pr(S)
= {;(l-v)'Pr(K) + Opr(K)/ow2_pr(S)}'9b + Pr(S)Pr(K)'{I-v)(1 - ~ ~)
PreS)
2
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Since the objective function and constraint are given by
Max P - C(g,h) - WI + 6 [Pr(K)Pr(S)Q ]a (*) a
s.t R ~ WI + 6b[Pr(S)Pr(K)~ + U-T],
(** )
we can obtain (5'), (5'), and (7') by substituting the above results.
Derivation of (13')
Denote K = Pr{K), 's = Pr{S), K' = oPr(K)/oW2, S' = oPr(S)/oW2. The foe for
W2 is written as
6a[S'-K-aa - S'K] + 6b[S'K + K"S-~] = 0
~
= P+g+h+E(~oIK)-W2 = XI-w2, Xl = P+g+h+E(~OIK)
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A ,...
==> W (OaS - °bK) = °as'X1 -
°a
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°b + °bK'X2
0-0
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= Xl - 8(X1-X2) - a b
°as - °bK
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°b"YK
= O"Y + 0
'
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,..
2
"YK = -K'W , "YS = S'W (elasticities)
Also, using elasticities
-0 Kb
°a- °b °a-ob W2 d
°as - °bK
=
°a"YS+ob"YK'
, an
X1-X2 = (g-g)+h+E(~OIK)+T-E(~IS)+Fb
Thus
(13') w2
= P+g+h+E(~OIK) - 8[(g-g)+h+E(~OIK)+T-E(~IS)+Fb]
°a-ob
.w2
°a"YS+Ob"YK
Derivation of (14') and (15')
2 .
The foe for g and Ware
Ci') Cg = oa[;'(v-~)'K'~a + S'K] + ob[(l-S'K)~ + ;OS''b],
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Adding RHS of (5') to (6') we obtain (14')
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An alternative expression is obtained by removin~ & from (1') (This
a
corresponds to old (14'». Multiply (v-~)/(l-v) to (5') and subtract the
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